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what the police think their interests may be, and with little concern
for the rights of individuals.
The defects of the Supreme Court doctrine are made patent here
and in the Writings of Mr. Chief Justice Traynor and Judge Friendly
to which reference has already been made.' 8 The merits of the Schaefer
proposal are well set out in this small volume, for all those whose minds
are not closed to examine and weigh. I am among those who like Mr.
Justice Schaefer's answer. Perhaps, however, I should choose another
path than the constitutional amendment, at least to begin with. Congress, too, was given authority to interpret and implement the substantive clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Court has recognized
this power and, indeed, in one instance has accepted Congressional interpretation with an alacrity and submissiveness that was almost unbecoming. 19 I should advocate, therefore, that the Schaefer proposal
be embodied in legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to its fourteenth amendment powers. If and when the Supreme Court is confronted with such legislation, we shall, perhaps, have answers to questions even more fundamental than those so admirably treated in this
book.
PHILIP B.

KURLAND*

18 See notes 1 &2, supra.
19 See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79.
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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Of all the federally-aided public assistance programs, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), formerly called Aid to Dependent
Children, is the most notorious and least understood, the most costly
yet the least adequate in grants. Some observers who witnessed the
passage of its predecessors, state Mother's Pension laws, forecast controversy and ill effects from a program that provided cash payment,
rather than the then-customary provision of aid-in-kind or in institutions-poor farms, orphanages, and the like. One critic, the well-known
social worker, Mary Richmond, regarded Mother's Pensions as a backward step; they were providing "public funds not to widows only,
mark you, but to private families, funds to the families of those who
have deserted and are going to desert."' Yet another raised the basic
1
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issue: whether it is a "dangerous experiment [to try] to solve social
problems by merely giving money." 2 Anyone who doubts that the issue
persists today is advised to consider the response of civil rights groups
to the Moynihan Report. And anyone who sees the issue as peculiar
to our race-relations-conscious age will gain a new perspective from
Dr. Bell's account of Aid to Dependent Children.3
AFDC was one of the original public assistance titles in the Social
Security Act of 1935. Plainly, it was an afterthought so far as Congress
was concerned. Legislative energies had centered on the complicated
business of establishing a national social insurance system and a taxoffset scheme to stimulate the states to mount their own programs of
unemployment compensation. What little attention public assistance
received was directed to Old Age Assistance, a practical means of assuring income for the aged while the insurance system matured.
AFDC was enacted as a grant-in-aid to the states to buttress existing
programs under Mother's Pension laws and to stimulate wider adoption
of these measures. 4 Then, as now, great variation in extent of coverage
was evident. "Worthy" widows' children were universally included,
but in some states those of the "unworthy" were excluded, and in others
children of non-widows were ineligible, irrespective of the worthiness
of their mothers. 5 Prior to Mother's Pension laws, too many children
were taken from their natural families because of poverty, not for lack
of a satisfactory caretaker. A new philosophy was first given voice at
the 1912 White House Conference on Dependent Children: "Home
life is the highest and finest product of civilization... the great moulding force of mind and character. Children should not be deprived of
No child should be
it except for urgent and compelling reasons ....
deprived of his family by reason of poverty alone."
Many early Mother's Pension laws reflected a bargain struck between
opponents of unrestricted money payments-who feared the loss of
control over the indolent, intemperate poor, which would result from
subsidizing home life as a substitute for orphanage or almshouse care
-and the opponents of needless separation of children from worthy
and struggling parents.
And yet the bargain had a price, whose full measure is attempted
2 Id. at 490 (Charles F. Weller).
3 For convenience Miss Bell refers throughout to the old title of both the program and
administering agency: ADC and Bureau of Public Assistance, since 1962 AFDC and Bureau
of Family Services (a unit within the Welfare Administration of HEW).
4 Pp. 20-27.
5 SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMmuCA 235-36 (1937).
6 P. 4.
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by the author of this book. For prejudice against "outdoor" cash relief
-against the kind of money payment programs we know so well today
-remained strong. A special showing had been required to support
outdoor relief: the helplessness of age, infirmity or immaturity. And
in the case of children the probable course of their development had
been weighed into the scales. Insisting on a suitable home as a condition to expending public funds was seen, in the several states which
inserted suitable home requirements, to offer "reasonable assurance
that children will have a home which will. . make possible a moral,
physical and mental development." When widows were the sole caretakers entitled to receive these funds, the task of separating fit from
unfit mothers was a simpler one. The more liberal the eligibility requirements, however, the more difficult the application of a suitable
home policy, for in more liberal jurisdictions officials necessarily had
to consider the fitness of homes of deserted wives and unwed mothers,
two classes vulnerable to attack on the basis of status, as well as to
make individual determinations of suitability.
This burden now weighs especially heavily in AFDC in light of its
broadened coverage. From grants to children only, the scope of program has widened to take in, first, a single caretaker and then both
parents.8 The increase in AFDC recipients, therefore, is the product
of increasing liberality of eligibility standards as well as economic and
demographic factors. The characteristics of AFDC recipients have
changed, revealing a caseload heavily composed of deserted wives and
unmarried mothers.9 The multi-problem family has appeared, and
with it has dawned the apprehension that its procreation in successive
generations has been abetted through the funds of AFDC. 10
One cause is strikingly apparent-the change in social insurance.
When, in 1939, survivors and dependents of wage earners were added
to the Old Age Insurance program and qualifications for coverage cut
way down, most "worthy" widows moved from AFDC into the insurance program. The move was warmly applauded. Survivorship had
long been seen as a predictable risk suitable for social insurance. The
nation liked the objectivity of this approach: Away with the means
test; entitlement now claims the dayl These poor were thus de-stigma7

P. 7.

8

64 Stat. 551 (1950), 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1964) (federal matching for the mother or other
needy caretaker-relative); 76 Stat. 186 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1964) (federal matching for

both parents where one is unemployed).
9 Perkins, AFDC in Review, 1936-62, 1 WaMaa IN REVIEW 1 (1962).
10 See generally STINER, SocIAL INSECURITY: THE PoLrrics oF WE FARE (1966), for a broad
and detailed survey of the politics and problems of public assistance.
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tized-in part, of course, because all who qualify for social insurance
are entitled to it without the necessity of proving need."'
But groups remain for whom social insurance is unavailable or insufficient; the persistent growth of public assistance attests to this. In
a triple-decker public welfare system, social insurance is the first line
of defense and general assistance the last; the federal categorical aids
fall in between. Dr. Bell's objective is to "explore . . . [the deter-

minants of] relationships among communities, public aid programs
and poor families.' 12 Rather than attempt a global survey of AFDC
since its inception, she emphasizes a single, crucial policy-that of
"suitable home"-to find its function and its consequences.
Dr. Bell's book is a frontal assault on the suitable-home policy;
it is not, as its title implies, a comprehensive survey of the many facets
of this federal-state public assistance program. She relates her purpose
to shifting opinions of the causes of poverty:
Public welfare policies reflect at least two conflicting assumptions about the causes of poverty. Some assume that it is selfwilled by its immoral, irresponsible, undisciplined, or incompetent victims. Conversely, others reflect the assumption that
poverty is socially determined and so narrows the range of
alternatives and so isolates families from the mainstream of
American life and values that parental conformity and competence cannot be realistically expected until there are major
adaptations in the opportunity structure. Clearly the public
provisions for financial assistance and social services at different times and places will depend upon the prevalent view
regarding the causal attribution of poverty. This is nowhere
better illustrated than in an examination of "suitable home"
policies. 13
The central problem, as she sees it, remains one which had plagued
promotors of the Mother's Pension laws-distinguishing the morally
fit from the unfit in the course of administering public assistance. As her
analysis reveals, the suitable-home policy has been employed to cut the
costs of AFDC by restricting its availability to preferred families.
Understandably, its application has differed, both among the states
with such policies on the books, and within the same state from one
era to the next. The permissive character of federal legislation, heavy
11 This factor, rather than the idea of "right" derived from contributions, becomes increasingly important as departure from the contributory principle is extended. See generally Burns, Social Security in Evolution: Toward What?, 39 SOCIAL SERVICE REv IEV 129
(1965).
12 P. vi.

13 P. vi.
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reliance on local financing, and moralistic fashions of the past are
factors to which inadequate coverage of Mother's Pensions and early
AFDC programs have been attributed. But even now, with mandatory
statewide coverage, dominant federal financing, and eligibility conditions which prima facie include unwed mothers and deserted families, as well as others whom states had previously excluded,1 4 the gap
between the population at risk and the AFDC caseload persists. AFDC,
in the author's words, remains an "elite" program in several states.
Her conclusion is supported, moreover, despite the apparent irrelevance of a suitable-home policy as a technique for controlling the size
and composition of an assistance caseload. The policy's explicit purpose
is protective. It is defensible as a logical extension of juvenile court
philosophy, representing social concern about a child's development.
Yet legislative purpose is only the starting point for administrative
practice, and the latent functions of policy may well belie publicly
proclaimed goals. Expressing her indebtedness to Robert Merton's
formulations of manifest and latent function, Dr. Bell attempts to
determine the full range of consequences of the suitable-home policy
and its "functional equivalents."' 5 In my opinion, she does this job
well.
She thoroughly reviews jurisdictions which have heavily relied on
a suitability policy to close, or to declare initially ineligible, assistance
cases. Classifying states according to their use of this policy, whether
to justify outright refusal of any type of assistance, 16 to disqualify for
AFDC,17 or to exert leverage to bring about "voluntary placement"
of children from presumptively undesirable homes,' the author traces
application of the policy through official and other authoritative
reports. Consequences in contradiction of explicit purpose are documented over and over, regardless of the precise form of the policy
that appears in a given state. The popular argument favoring a suitability requirement as a child protective policy is undercut by her
demonstration of the lack of further state action to protect the children
subject to the hazardous conditions which unsuitable homes create.
Referrals to the courts did not increase; services were not extended
to parents to render them more capable of meeting community stan14 A review of pre-1935 state Mother's Pension Laws is available in SocIAL SEcurITY
BOARD, SOCIAL SEcURrry IN A ERICA 233-49 (1937). Compare state plan requirements and
eligibility criteria set forth in Social Security Act of 1935, title IV, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (Supp. I, 1965).
15 Pp. vii-viii.

16 Ch. VII.
17 Ch.VIII.
18 Ch. VIII.
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dards of child care; and income payments (which might at least have
provided children food and shelter) frequently ceased, leaving families
to self-help or, less often, the inferior aid of general assistance. 19
The practices varied among the states and over the periods her study
covers. Moreover, suitable-home requirements were not always stringently applied; rather, they were adapted to the broader purposes of
AFDC within each jurisdiction. Where provision of a decent level of
financial aid was the state's primary goal in AFDC, and the state
moved to maximize its claims to federal matching funds with concomitant commitment of substantial local funds, the existence of a suitability
policy on the statute books was no deterrent. But where general opposition to this income maintenance program was expressed or where
controversy existed over the wisdom of supporting children so that
mothers with young ones at home had an alternative to employment,
the policy provided leverage to control the program's size and composition. In several southern states, for example, Negro children tended
20
to be represented on the rolls in numbers disproportionately small.
In the northern states the policy was used selectively when caseloads
rose in large cities and increasing numbers claimed eligibility because
of desertion or illegitimacy. 21 Dr. Bell makes it clear that the source
of stimulation for restrictive policy could vary, and the attitudes expressed on race and immorality differ. Yet in all the states committed
to a suitable-home policy, "parental morality was the primary and
22
almost exclusive concern."
The Louisiana crisis called the policy to national attention. A 1960
law barred payment to "a child living with its mother if the mother
has had an illegitimate child after receiving assistance .... ,23Checks
were subsequently discontinued to 5,991 families with 22,501 children.
Ninety-five percent of these children were Negro. In most families the
fathers were "elsewhere"; the offending adults were mothers, whose
illegitimate children were evidence of the unsuitability of their homes.
Adverse publicity put pressure on the federal agency to examine the
Louisiana program for conformity with "state plan' requirements
and determine whether federal matching should be refused. In January, 1961, the decision of the Social Security Commissioner was an19 General assistance is both less comprehensive, as a rule, of items making up the standard budget and less generous in grant amounts; it is also subject to controls eliminated or
restricted under the federal categorical aids (e.g., payment in kind). See pp. 115-17.
20 Pp. 34, 181-83.
21 Pp. 111-17.

22 P. 179.
23

P. 179.
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nounced: no basis for a finding of nonconformity could be supported
despite suspicion as to Louisiana's purposes:
In the face of the many precedents and analogies established
... in

the administration of the Social Security Act, no practical alternative was left . . . but to conclude that on the

balance, in the absence of any [federal] requirement prohibiting states to use "suitable-home" as an eligibility factor,
the imposition of [such a] . . . requirement standing alone,

does not constitute a circumstance which calls for disapproval
of a state plan . . .even though the result might be . . .to

deny subsistence needs to children while 24
they still remain
in an environment found to be unsuitable.
The charge to the federal agency was unmistakable. The following
day, Secretary Flemming announced a new suitable-home ruling to
which states must conform if federal matching were sought. States
no longer could deny assistance on suitability grounds so long as the
child remained in the home. Subsequently, Congress acted to legitimate the ruling and extend AFDC to children in foster homes under
specified conditions. 25 And one year later federal policy was further
modified by legislation permitting denial of AFDC to families with
unsuitable homes "if provision is otherwise made . . . for adequate

care and assistance" for the children. 28 A Michigan-proposed compromise, this amendment has permitted transfer of unsuitable-home families to general assistance, thereby allowing states to maintain a distinctive character among AFDC recipients without the risk of losing federal
funds for those remaining on that program.
Here Dr. Bell's account concludes, save for some final observations
and recommendations. She has sifted the material, no mean task in
the field of welfare administration, and rescued it from obscurity and
superficial treatment. In a field too sparing with detailed analysis and too
chary of the printed word, Dr. Bell has conscientiously produced a
wealth of facts on a crucial policy. She has, moreover, usefully ordered
and interpreted this material. Perhaps, in stating methodology, she
claims too much when she asserts "the pragmatism of the twentieth
century has produced investigative models that avoid the pitfalls of
subjectivity and speculation," 27 but her contention that attending to
"the end products of action" affords new insights into "the nature of
24 P. 146.
25 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1964).
26 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
2T Pp. vi-vii.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:709

the action and its significance for individuals, groups, and the social
system" 28 is supported by the study.

And yet I must express some reservations. One or two are quibbles:
The references are uneven. Statutory citations are sometimes omitted,
and the source materials (e.g., in the chapter on Louisiana) are not as
fully reprinted as is required for a comprehensive grasp of the issues.
There are instances of misinterpretations. The Handbook of Public
Assistance Administration, for example, merely provides the states
with interpretations of federal policy. The entire document neither
warrants nor requires publication in the Federal Register, as she suggests, although I heartily agree it needs more visibility and more efficient circulation.2 9 The "Service" Amendments of 1962, to which some
passing criticism is given, 30 are treated superficially. Their awesome
potential in conjunction with the policy of suitable home deserves
more attention, for these amendments, in effect, assure the evaluation
of every AFDC family's problems and, by virtue of the indivisibility
of service function from budgetary decisions, expand the welfare
worker's powers over personal conduct beyond the range that previously existed.3 1
But my most serious reservations concern what is omitted. The author
fully appreciates the adaptability of the suitable-home policy to minimize income maintenance burdens within a state and to serve as a
social sanction against particular adults, but she fails to place it in
perspective as only one of several strategies to achieve these ends.
Thoughtful confrontation of the total range of problems in public
assistance is essential to policy reform. The suitable-home requirement
is but one of many ways by which states have sought to control their
overall financial burdens of assistance. It is simply one strategy for
screening and controlling aid to needy populations that are politically
vulnerable. The remedies she advances for curing the suitable-home
syndrome of AFDC too closely resemble Lydia Pinkham's potion for
producing a transient sensation of cure.
A signal difficulty with federal-state grant-aided programs derives
28 P. vii.
29 The Welfare Law Bulletin of February, 1967, announced that a revised version of
the handbook, now in preparation, will be published in the Federal Register. N.Y.U.,
WELFARE LAw BULLETIN No. 7, p. 2 (1967).
30 Pp. 170-73.
31 Mencher, Perspectives on Recent Welfare Legislation: Fore and Aft, 8 SoCIA. WoRK
59 (July 1963). These points are spelled out in considerable detail in Handler &
Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 377 (1966). See also the provisions for money-management counseling
and protective-payment procedures; 272 Stat. 1048 (1958), 76 Stat. 188 (1962), 76 Stat. 189
(1962), 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a), 605, 606 (1964).
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from their federalist character. Public assistance of the categorical
variety is not a national system. Though less parochial than general
assistance, it still leaves the states substantial leeway to dictate eligibility and other standards and conditions of assistance. Moreover, the
states possess a basic choice-whether or not to avail themselves of
the federal funds which are conditioned on creation of the federallyauthorized programs. While in the major categorical programs this
choice is, practically speaking, foreclosed (all states now participate
in AFDC and the three "adult" programs, Aid to the Aged, Blind,
Disabled), less than half of the states have adopted newer variants of
AFDC. Only 22 extend aid to families in which the cause of dependency is unemployment; 32 24 avail themselves of AFDC-F, which per33
mits federal matching to children outside the home in foster care.
Not only do the states control this basic choice-not to provide
federally-aided relief, a more adequate form of income maintenance
than wholly local programs typically supply-but several options of
a lesser order also belong to them. These options concern definition of
eligibility as well as the level and ingredients of the grant to recipients.
Thus, federal law may authorize AFDC grants to children still in
school beyond their 18th birthdays-as it does34 -but the states fail
to extend their own age limits. Grant level is, and always has been
since a battle with the southern states in 1935,35 a matter for state
determination. The result is the expected one: in the continental
United States the variation in average grant for AFDC runs from a
low of $7.90 per recipient in Mississippi to a high of $51.44 in New
York. 6 And, of course, averages obscure important differences. Not
only do the states vary as to grant levels per recipient, but also some
impose ceilings on the grant, irrespective of family size and budgeted
need, which affects the size of the average payment. Federal control over
the items which go into budgetary calculation of a family's need is
minimal. One state may include personal allowances and medical care
in the budget, another may be more restrictive. Neither state plan
requirements nor the federal handbook contain explicit standards as
37
to items which must be included.
The listing is available in 4 WELFARE IN RFvmW 31 (1966).
Id. at 83.
34 79 Stat. 422 (1965), 42 U.S.C. 606(a)(2) (Supp. I, 1965).
35 WrTT, TnE DEVELOPmENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AcT 144-45 (1962).
36 4 VELFAR IN REvImw 30 (1966).
37 The state plan requirements, as interpretqd by HEW, specify that the standard
of assistance and policies for determination of need be uniform throughout the state.
See, e.g., 79 Stat. 418 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1), (3) (Supp. I, 1965); U.S. Bureau of
Family Services, Dep't of HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. 4,
32
33
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But what clearly demonstrates that states occupy the role of dealer
in the assistance game is their freedom to institute percentage cuts.
Budgetary standards are meticulously prepared for every category. An
elaborate process of pricing items produces a state's best estimate of
subsistence living for the blind, disabled, aged, and families with dependent children. Then, if the public welfare agency's appropriation
is deficient to cover all recipients, the official measure of need may be
officially reduced to jibe with fiscal reality-usually by a lesser percent
for adult recipients, and by greater proportions for those on AFDC.3s
8
I do not doubt the author knows all of this well, but I question
that she has used her knowledge to best advantage when criticizing
the federal bureauracy and advancing her recommendations. If, as she
demonstrates so convincingly, a suitability requirement is one tactic
to close the gap between the needs identified by state and federal
agency and the resources under local control (the availability of which
determines the amount of federal matching), then why will abolishing
or limiting its use not trigger other strategies to keep the program
within acceptable bounds? One can criticize the federal agency for
"abrogating responsibility and leadership to the states,"8 9 and yet that
agency's position must be evaluated in relation to all the twists and
turns by which the states have received the federal dollar with diminishing proportions of their own.
The underlying issue is not the application of a single, suitable-home
policy. It is the wisdom of adherence to categorical approaches and
to state and local schemes of income maintenance. If we desire equality
of treatment among the nation's needy with respect to income (I purposely exclude services and other welfare aids), the federal grants to
categories are poorly designed to achieve that end. Inherent in the
§ 3131 (effective 7/6/66). The Handbook further implements this requirement by identifying three permissible alternative methods for determination of need under the public
assistance titles. Ibid. See also Wmr, SIMPLFIED METHODS FOR DEITMXNING Nmms
(1964). Nowhere is there explicit reference to mandatory inclusion of basic consumption items in the grant. The approach of HEW is, so to speak, procedural, not substantive, which raises fresh problems in high-grant states. In Illinois, e.g., the AFDC
budgets make provision not only for all basic consumption items as well as medical care
and certain incidentals, but further provide budget differentials by age groups. Thus, a
family of four with two teenage children receives a larger grant for food than a family
of comparable size with two very young children. HEW, in justification of the newly
promulgated version of § 3131, takes the following position: "Since a method without
breaks by age groups is preferable, any standard including one or more age breaks
cannot be approved unless the State submits special justification." U.S. Bureau of
Family Services, supra.
88 S. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See also AVIsoRY COUNCIL ON PUBLIc
WELFARE, REPORT 16-19 (1966).
39 P. 175.
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scheme is state discretion as to classes aided, standards established, and
controls attempted over the personal conduct of recipients. The fact
that federal limits are seen as necessary emphasizes the reality of state
discretion. I would not gainsay the fruitfulness of further attempts to
standardize administration among the states so as to maximize the
area of uniformity between state programs which are significantly
"national" in tax base and in important policies. Moreover, as Dr.
Bell recommends, significant advances in coverage could be gained by
"extend[ing] aid to all needy families with children irrespective of
home conditions, family composition, or parental conduct and refus[ing] approval of all welfare policies which disproportionately exclude
certain types of families on any ground whatsoever." 40
Nevertheless, intractable pressures for diversity exist; they are generated by the structure.4 1 The tortured history of the suitable-home policy attests to this, and the history of other strategies of state control
reinforces this fundamental point.
It remains to face the choices-equality for what and at what standard; diversity for what?-and find the structures best adapted to the
public's aims. Aid to Dependent Children points both a warning and
a challenge. To produce a better program will not be easy, but failure
to try would be cowardly and irresponsible.
MARGARET K. ROSENHEIM*
40

P. 195.

41 See, e.g., pp. 150-51; SMNER, Op. cit. supra note 10, passim.

* Professor, The University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration.
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The meaning of words tends to become corroded over years of usage,
especially when they are used in the political field. Thus, the term
"state's rights" conjures up visions of Governor Faubus defying the
Supreme Court of the United States (and the United States Constitution), or the South's lady governor trumpeting in parrot tones that no
Congress will make no law that she doesn't like. Since the people have
had no vocabulary for talking about the role of the state in the federal
system, the real problems of the state animal have been examined only
by the academicians, and then only infrequently. It has been much

